This is a repository of my thoughts, my analysis and frameworks that I use to build my convictions.
These reflections on Sahel gold—production estimates, value chain economics, and a policy sequence from formalization to low-cost financing—represent my independent analysis only. No external validations or institutional views included.
How Sahel Countries Could Benefit from Their Gold
The Starting Point
Sahel countries produce significant quantities of gold. Much of the economic benefit stays local—circulating through communities near mining sites. What's missing is the infrastructure to capture value at the national level: reserves, low-cost financing, coordinated reinvestment.
Between 2020 and 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad produced an estimated 850–1,050 tons of gold—worth $70–85 billion at current prices. The wide range reflects uncertainty in artisanal production, much of which goes unrecorded.
Artisanal mining is widespread and deeply rooted in local economies. Rather than working against this reality, effective policy works with it—creating conditions where formal participation becomes the path of least resistance for miners. The question is whether there's a policy sequence that could redirect the flow—keeping gold within national economies and converting it into development capital.
The answer appears to be yes, but it requires treating gold policy as a pipeline rather than a single intervention. Each step enables the next.
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Establish centralized purchasing
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Build gold reserves
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┌───┴───┐
↓ ↓
Low-cost Regional
financing collaboration
↓ ↓
└───┬───┘
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Broader economic development
But before walking through the pipeline, it's worth understanding what artisanal mining contributes—both to local economies and to the broader mining investment cycle.
The Economic Case for Artisanal Mining
Where the Value Stays
The fundamental difference between industrial and artisanal gold mining is where the money goes.
In the LBMA value chain, 60-70% of final value stays with artisanal miners. They spend nearly all of it locally: food, housing, transport, services. The cash circulates within communities.
Industrial operators repatriate 60-80% of revenues to foreign shareholders and suppliers. The extraction happens locally. The wealth accumulation happens elsewhere.
Bazillier and Girard's 2020 study of Burkina Faso's gold boom found that opening an artisanal mine increases household consumption by 15% within a 10km radius. Industrial mines showed no statistically significant effect on local consumption.
Artisanal mining distributes income across many small operators who spend locally. Industrial mining concentrates income in a single firm that spends globally.
Complementarity, Not Opposition
Artisanal and industrial mining serve different functions in the investment cycle. Artisanal activity is, in effect, distributed geological exploration. When artisanal miners concentrate in an area, they signal ore presence—de-risking the geology for larger operators. Industrial companies often follow artisanal activity rather than precede it.
This creates complementarity. Artisanal mining generates immediate local value and geological proof of concept. Industrial mining, if it follows, generates fiscal revenue and larger-scale extraction.
The transition mechanism remains unresolved. How a site moves from artisanal to industrial without displacing the communities that de-risked it—compensation structures, local equity stakes, employment provisions—requires further work.
The Multiplier Effect
World Bank and IGF analyses estimate a dependency ratio of 1:6—for every artisanal miner, six additional people depend directly on that income. This includes not just family members but the entire local value chain: food vendors, equipment suppliers, mechanics, transporters, lodging providers, retailers.
In logistics hubs like Abéché, mining wages drive demand for food, water, and equipment. Markets exist because miners exist.
There's also seasonal complementarity. In the Sahel, artisanal mining functions as a counter-seasonal activity. Gold income allows farmers to purchase inputs and survive the dry season, reducing pressure for urban migration.
Regional Evidence
The pattern holds across the region:
Burkina Faso: Despite security challenges, artisanal mining is more effective at reducing immediate rural poverty than industrial mining. Wealth distribution is broader and less enclave-like.
Ghana: Artisanal mine presence increases real per capita income by 2% nationally, primarily through non-agricultural income stimulation. The sector diversifies rural economies beyond subsistence agriculture.
Tanzania: In Geita region, communities with artisanal mining show statistically lower rates of extreme poverty than purely agricultural communities. The sector acts as a buffer against drought and crop failure.
Industrial mining generates fiscal revenue. Artisanal mining generates social stability and geological de-risking. They serve different functions in both the local economy and the investment cycle. In regions where state presence is structurally limited, a formalized artisanal miner is a citizen with a job rather than a young person with a grievance.
Production Scale
Estimated gold production for AES countries plus Chad (2020–2024):
| Country | Annual Range (tons) | 5-Year Estimate |
|---|---|---|
| Mali | 50–100 | ~350 tons |
| Burkina Faso | 50–94 | ~280 tons |
| Niger | minimal industrial | ~10 tons |
| Chad | minimal recorded | ~5 tons |
| Industrial subtotal | ~645 tons | |
| Artisanal (estimated) | largely unrecorded | 200–400 tons |
| Total | 850–1,050 tons |
Data quality is poor. The IMF flagged $3 billion in unrecorded gold exports from Chad in 2023 alone. Official figures likely understate actual flows.
Current Efforts
Formalization is already underway. Chad established SONEMIC (Société Nationale d'Exploitation Minière et de Contrôle) to coordinate the mining sector. Burkina Faso created ANEEMAS (Agence Nationale d'Encadrement des Exploitations Minières Artisanales et Semi-mécanisées), which has trained over 27,000 artisanal miners and is building the country's first national gold refinery. Mali launched West Africa's first state-owned refinery in 2025, with capacity for 200 tons per year.
Regional coordination is emerging through SEMICA, which convenes annual mining sector conferences in Ouagadougou, and through the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), whose economic integration agenda includes mining policy harmonization. These efforts are early-stage but provide institutional foundations for the policy pipeline described below.
The Policy Pipeline
Step 1: Formalize Artisanal Mining
Formalization means removing barriers that make legal participation unattractive. When selling gold formally costs more than selling it informally—through taxes, fees, or bureaucratic friction—miners choose informal channels.
Tax-free or low-tax status for artisanal production changes the calculation. The goal isn't maximum extraction of fiscal revenue from each transaction. It's bringing the sector into visibility where downstream value capture becomes possible.
Formalization also enables data collection. Understanding production volumes, locations, and flows is prerequisite to any further policy.
Establish 2-3 Zones d'Exploitation Artisanale (ZEAs) in high-activity regions. Provide legal clarity: mining in these zones is permitted, taxed lightly or not at all, and supported with basic infrastructure (water, access roads). Test formalization mechanics before scaling.
Step 2: Establish Purchasing Mechanisms
Formalization creates the possibility of domestic sale. Purchasing mechanisms create the infrastructure.
The model: government-backed or licensed purchasing points that offer competitive prices—close enough to international rates that smuggling isn't worth the risk. If the domestic buyer pays 90-95% of London spot, most miners will sell domestically.
This retains resources nationally, disrupts smuggling economics, and creates a channel for reserve accumulation.
Establish one purchasing point in an existing logistics hub (Abéché, for example). Partner with an established refiner or bank for price transparency. Track volumes for 12 months. Use data to design national rollout.
Step 3: Build Gold Reserves
With purchasing infrastructure in place, governments can systematically accumulate reserves. This serves three functions:
Currency backing. Reserves provide a tangible asset base for local currencies—credibility that pure fiat currencies lack.
Monetary policy space. Countries with gold holdings have more room to maneuver than those entirely dependent on foreign exchange.
Strategic positioning. Central banks globally have been net gold buyers for over a decade. Building reserves now positions Sahel countries for multiple possible monetary futures.
Create a dedicated gold reserve account at the central bank. Begin with purchased gold from the pilot hub—even small volumes. Publish reserves quarterly. Visibility matters: it signals intent to international partners and domestic audiences.
Step 4a: Access Low-Cost Financing
This is where reserves convert to development capital.
Traditional financing for Sahel countries is expensive. Multilateral loans carry high interest rates reflecting perceived country risk. Gold-backed borrowing offers an alternative: when loans are collateralized by physical gold, the lender's risk shifts from sovereign risk to gold price risk. Result: significantly lower interest rates.
A 5 percentage point reduction on a $500 million loan is $25 million per year in avoided interest—money available for development rather than debt service.
Commission a study on gold-backed financing structures. What collateralization ratios are required? Which international lenders have appetite? What legal frameworks exist? The study itself signals seriousness to potential lenders.
Step 4b: Regional Collaboration
The logic above applies more strongly at regional scale. The Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) provides a coordination mechanism.
A shared reserve system pools resources across countries. Unified pricing reduces arbitrage that smugglers exploit. Regional coordination increases bargaining power in international negotiations.
Propose a working group on gold policy coordination within AES. Agenda: harmonized purchasing prices, information sharing on smuggling routes, joint reserve feasibility study. Start with coordination, not integration—build trust incrementally.
Step 5: Development Investment
The endpoint is low-cost capital for development: agriculture, infrastructure, manufacturing. These are sectors where patient capital makes projects viable that wouldn't be at market rates.
A structural consideration: large-scale industrial approaches may not fit Sahel contexts. Limited infrastructure and dispersed populations favor decentralized models. Gold revenue reinvested in context-appropriate development creates a different growth path than traditional resource extraction.
Allocate a percentage of purchasing agency margins to a development fund. Even 5% of throughput, invested in agricultural inputs or rural infrastructure near ZEAs, demonstrates the reinvestment principle. Visibility matters more than scale initially.
Implementation Sequence
The small wins above can be sequenced over 24-36 months:
| Phase | Timeline | Actions |
|---|---|---|
| Phase 1 | Months 1-6 | Designate 2-3 ZEAs; establish legal framework for tax-free artisanal zones; begin baseline data collection |
| Phase 2 | Months 6-12 | Launch pilot purchasing hub; create central bank gold account; initiate AES working group discussions |
| Phase 3 | Months 12-24 | Scale purchasing to additional hubs based on pilot data; commission gold-backed financing study; establish development fund |
| Phase 4 | Months 24-36 | First gold-backed financing transaction; regional coordination mechanism operational; development fund investments visible |
Each phase generates data and credibility for the next. Failure at any stage is contained—pilot programs can be adjusted without national-scale consequences.
Addressing Objections
Policy shifts create resistance. Anticipated objections and responses:
| Objection | Response |
|---|---|
| "Artisanal mining funds conflict" | Prohibition pushes the sector underground and into non-state hands. Formalization creates a "citizen economy" with a stake in stability, displacing criminal elements. |
| "The state collects no revenue" | Direct royalties are lower than industrial mining, but indirect value is substantial: VAT on consumption by thousands of miners, plus avoided costs in security and social assistance. Net fiscal impact is positive. |
| "Environmental destruction" | Technical problem, not criminal one. Decentralized processing hubs and technical assistance are more effective than enforcement crackdowns. |
| "Food insecurity from mining booms" | Food price inflation occurs when the sector is chaotic. Planned ZEAs with supply chain management reduce disruption. |
The Core Proposition
Sahel countries have a resource that currently generates limited sovereign benefit. A policy sequence exists that could change this—formalization, centralized purchasing, reserve accumulation, low-cost financing, development investment.
Each step is individually rational. The sequence is mutually reinforcing. The obstacles are real but addressable through phased implementation.
The approach aligns with the African Mining Vision: valuing mineral resources not only for what they export, but for the communities they sustain.
Industrial mining generates fiscal revenue. Artisanal mining generates stability. A policy framework that captures both—rather than prioritizing one at the expense of the other—extracts maximum value from the resource base.
The technical pathway exists. Implementation requires political will, institutional capacity, and regional coordination. Starting small—with pilots, working groups, and feasibility studies—builds the evidence base and credibility for larger moves.
A formalized artisanal miner is a citizen with a job. A functioning purchasing mechanism is a channel for reserve accumulation. A reserve is collateral for cheap financing. Cheap financing is development capital.
The pipeline works. The question is whether to build it.